I. INTRODUCTION
T he federal income tax system is based on family income rather than individual income. Taxpayers generally fi le their federal income tax returns under one of three fi ling statuses: single, married fi ling jointly, or head of household.
1 Even though both married and cohabiting couples may pool resources and have similar living arrangements, married couples cannot choose the single or head of household fi ling status and cohabiting couples cannot fi le as married fi ling jointly. The income tax system is designed in such a way that many elements -such as the rate schedules, standard deductions, and credits -are dependent on fi ling status. As a result, while the federal income tax system refl ects differences in taxpayers' abilities to pay according to fi ling status, it is not neutral with respect to marriage. That is, a couple living together can pay more or less in federal income taxes depending on whether they are legally married.
The American family has gone through major changes in the past decades. According to a recent Pew Research Center analysis (Cohn et al., 2011) of decennial U.S. Census data, over half of all adults, or about 120 million adults, in the United States were married in 2010, representing a sharp decline from 72 percent in 1960. 3 At the same time, other arrangements, including cohabitation, have become more prevalent. According to U.S. Census data, there were 7.6 million opposite-sex cohabiting couples in 2011, which is an 18 percent increase from 2007. 4 If each member of a cohabiting couple fi les his or her own tax return, then cohabiting couples could represent over 10 percent of all tax returns fi led for 2011. 5 The falling trend in marriage rates relative to cohabitation has several tax policy implications. First, it raises the question of whether the tax system fails to tax an increasing number of families appropriately based on their ability to pay, particularly cohabitants who have similar living arrangements as married couples but cannot use the married fi ling jointly status. Second, reducing marriage penalties in the tax code has been a policy goal in recent tax legislation. 6 With the declining trend in marriage rates, marriage penalty relief is extended to a decreasing number of targeted taxpayers (i.e., married couples) at the relative expense of an increasing number of other taxpayers (i.e., cohabiting couples). Third, changes in marriage rates will have an impact on tax revenue because cohabiting couples may pay more or less in income taxes if they fi le jointly. Consequently, it is of policy interest to know the revenue effect resulting from the increasing number of cohabiting couples who would be married and fi le joint returns had the marriage rate stayed relatively constant.
Motivated by the recent trends in family living arrangements and the associated policy implications, we have two goals in this study of federal individual income tax returns fi led by cohabiting couples: (1) to gain more knowledge about cohabiting couples' personal circumstances, such as income, child status, and fi ling behavior; and (2) to estimate the potential change in tax liability for cohabiting couples if they were married and fi led jointly. The latter is similar in concept but different from the estimation strategy of marriage penalties and bonuses defi ned by the Offi ce of Tax Analysis (OTA) of the 3 Adults in the Pew Research Center analysis are defi ned as individuals age 18 and older. The Pew Research
Center did not publish population counts in their study. To estimate the total number of adults age 18 and older who were married in 2010, we used the reported number of individuals age 18 and older for 2010 as published by the United States Census Bureau (Howden and Meyer, 2011 Treasury Department. OTA (Bull et al., 1999) defi nes marriage penalties and bonuses as a tax decrease or increase incurred by joint fi lers if they were unmarried and each were taxed as a single or head of household fi ler. This measure is appropriate in evaluating the effect of marriage penalty relief policies where the policy goal is to reduce the tax cost of marriage among taxpayers that are already married. In contrast, we refer to marriage penalties (or bonuses) in this paper as the estimated increase (or a decrease) in federal income tax liability for cohabiting couples if they were to fi le as married fi ling jointly.
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We use federal individual income tax return data to identify couples who are cohabiting in the year prior to fi ling a joint return. We note that this sample is not a representative sample of cohabiting couples since we exclude cohabiting couples that do not result in immediate marriage. Unlike studies that use survey data, we do not have to make assumptions about the fi ling behavior of unmarried couples because we have data from each person's tax return fi led when they are unmarried. Under 2007 law and incomes, 48 percent of cohabiting couples in our sample would have a tax increase if they were married and fi led jointly. Furthermore, 38 percent of the couples would have a tax decrease and 15 percent would have no substantive change in tax liability if they were married and fi led jointly. The average tax change is $1,657 for those who incur a marriage penalty and $914 for those with a marriage bonus. We explain the results by analyzing the couples' fi ling status, income, and presence of children, as well as several design features of the tax system. For cohabiting couples, declines in standard deductions and the earned income tax credit (EITC) under joint fi ling contribute to having a marriage penalty. In contrast, marriage bonuses arise primarily among couples in which the individuals have disparate incomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefl y reviews the literature. Section III describes the data, and Section IV provides details on the estimation strategy. Section V shows the results, and Section VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
To study the tax consequence of marriage, researchers estimate the amount of additional taxes, or tax savings, a married couple would incur had they not been married and fi led separate returns. Bull et al. (1999) discuss in detail the various methodologies used for estimating such marriage bonuses and penalties in the tax system. Studies estimating the tax consequence of marriage examine how specifi c tax laws or tax provisions affect the incidence and magnitudes of marriage penalties and bonuses. For example, Rosen (1987) and Feenberg and Rosen (1995) evaluate the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) on the magnitudes of marriage penalties. Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2000) evaluate the effect of the EITC on marriage penalties. Alm and Whittington (2001) evaluate various tax proposals considered by the Bush Administration that would have had direct or indirect effects on marriage penalties and bonuses. Gillette, Holtzblatt, and Lin (2005) show that an unindexed alternative minimum tax would eliminate the marriage penalty relief provided in the Economic Growth and Tax In addition to changes in tax laws, Alm and Whittington (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (2000a) fi nd that the long-term trend in the average amounts of marriage penalties and bonuses are also explained by changes in family structure and changes in labor market attachment of married women. Using longitudinal data, Gillette, Holtzblatt, and Lin (2006) show that changes over time in individual family circumstances -such as movements in and out of workforce by one or both spouses, birth of a child, or departure of an adult child -lead many couples to have a dynamic pattern of marriage penalty and bonus outcomes over a 10-year period. Researchers also investigate the relationship between marriage penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision. For example, Alm and Whittington (1995a , 1995b , 1997a , 1997b and Sjoquist and Walker (1995) fi nd that marriage taxes have a small effect on the marriage rate or the timing of marriage.
Other studies examine the marriage tax for unmarried individuals and estimate the potential change in taxes and government transfers for single individuals or unmarried cohabiting couples if they get married. Some studies impute the potential spouse's income to estimate the marriage penalty or bonus of unmarried individuals. For example, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) and Eissa and Hoynes (2003) estimate the effect of the EITC and transfer programs on the cost of marriage for single women, where the spouses' incomes are predicted based on the spouses' incomes of married females with similar demographics. Other studies examine single individuals' marriage cost with a focus on cohabiting couples, assuming that a cohabiting couple, if married, would maintain the same incomes and living arrangements. Using a sample of married and cohabiting couples, Eissa and Hoynes (2000b) fi nd a modest effect of the tax and transfer systems on the propensity to be married relative to cohabiting. Maag (2005) shows that the portion of low-income cohabiting parents subject to marriage penalties declined under 2008 tax law relative to 2003 tax law. Acs and Maag (2005) fi nd that cohabiting parents, regardless of whether they have a marriage penalty or bonus in the tax system, have lower TANF benefi ts if they get married.
III. DATA
To examine potential marriage penalties and bonuses of cohabiting couples, we use federal individual income tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service's Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW). CDW contains the population of tax returns as well as information returns generated by third parties such as the W-2 and Form 1099s. We then merge the tax return data with date of birth and gender for each member of a couple using the Social Security Administration data. We start with a 10 percent random sample of married fi ling jointly tax returns for tax year 2008.
We track couples based on the primary and secondary taxpayers' social security numbers and determine which portion of this sample is newly married and previously cohabiting based on the fi ling status and zip code reported on their 2006 and 2007 tax returns where either spouse is a primary fi ler. We analyze the cohabiting couples' 2007 tax returns for the estimation of potential marriage penalties and bonuses. Hence, the sample we analyze represents cohabiting couples in the year prior to fi ling a joint return.
We identify two groups of cohabiting couples. The fi rst group of cohabiting couples is identifi ed by a zip code match among couples in which both individuals separately fi le a tax return in years prior to fi ling a joint return in tax year 2008. In particular, the following conditions must hold: (1) Postal Service's delivery point bar code generated by algorithms using street, city, and state address.
9 Because tax returns for a particular year are generally fi led in the spring of the following year, the address on the 2007 tax return might not necessarily refl ect the place of residence during 2007. Consequently, we defi ne couples as cohabiting if there is a two-year match in zip code to be more confi dent that we identify couples who were living together in 2007.
The second group of cohabiting couples consists of couples in which one person fi les as single or head of household and claims the future spouse as a dependent on their 2007 tax return. For a taxpayer to claim a non-relative as a dependent, the individual must live with the taxpayer for the entire year, the taxpayer must provide for at least half of the non-relative's total support, and the non-relative cannot have gross income greater than the dependent exemption amount, which was $3,400 for 2007.
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There are about 5.4 million married fi ling jointly couples in our sample for 2008. Of those couples, 94 percent were married and fi ling jointly with the same spouse in 2007; 2 percent of the sample had at least one person who reported being married to a different person, fi led as married fi ling separately, or fi led as a widow with dependent children on his or her 2007 tax return. The remaining 4 percent were newly married couples of which about 20 percent were cohabiting in 2007.
include cohabiting couples in which one or both persons cannot be located in the tax data. Copen et al. (2012) fi nd that 56% of women and 58% of men cohabited with their fi rst spouse before entering marriage. These statistics indicate that our sample may be undercounting cohabiting couples prior to marriage. Subsequent analysis shows that couples with disparate incomes are more likely to have a potential marriage bonus, suggesting that this undercounting may have caused us to underestimate marriage bonus rates. However, if marital rates are affected by potential marriage taxes, then our estimates of marriage penalty rates may be downward biased and our estimates of marriage bonus rates may be upward biased because we only examine couples that marry. Consequently, we cannot determine the direction of the sample selection bias, but note that the following results may not necessarily apply to the cohabiting couple population as a whole. Table 1 contains summary statistics. Half of the sample consists of couples in which both persons fi led as single in 2007, 23 percent of couples have one single fi ler and one head of household fi ler, and 7 percent of couples have two head of household fi lers. The remaining 19 percent of the sample consists of one-fi ler couples in which one person fi les as single or head of household and claims the future spouse as a dependent. The median adjusted gross income (AGI) among individuals who have a lower AGI than their cohabitants is about $18,800 and among individuals who have a higher AGI than their cohabitants is $40,440.
12 The median fraction of income from the lower-income individual is 32 percent.
13 While 22 percent of the couples have one person making less than 5 percent of the family's total AGI, 31 percent of the couples have relatively equal incomes between the two partners, where the lower-income individual makes 40 to 50 percent of the family's total AGI. In addition, 77 percent of the couples are dual-earner couples and 21 percent are one-earner couples. The remaining 2 percent of the couples do not have earned income.
About 45 percent of the couples report having children, where children are the qualifying children for the child tax credit and/or the EITC as reported in the CDW data. Within the sample, 9 percent consists of couples in which both individuals report having dependent children; 18 percent of the sample consists of couples where the male taxpayer is the only one who has dependent children; and 18 percent are couples in which the female taxpayer is the only one who has dependent children.
14 Among couples in which only one individual claims dependent children, the individual with the higher AGI claims the children two-thirds of the time. In addition, the average 12 To preserve the confi dentiality of taxpayer data, medians in this paper are computed as the average value over the middle 10 observations. 13 Couples in which one or both individuals report having negative AGI on their separately fi led returns and couples with zero AGI are excluded from the calculation. 14 Individuals with a missing or unknown gender were coded as the opposite sex of the cohabiting partner.
Our data show a small number of same-sex couples. This information is taken as given as we cannot determine whether these are data errors or same-sex couples that are fi ling jointly. 16 17 percent of couples with children claim the child and dependent care credit (which is a non-refundable tax credit that subsidizes costs for dependent care incurred when taxpayers work); 62 percent claim the non-refundable child tax credit; and 46 percent claim the refundable additional child tax credit. In addition, 71 percent of the couples with children claim the EITC and 11 percent of childless couples claim the EITC.
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We use NBER's TAXSIM tax calculator to calculate cohabiting couples' tax liabilities under separate and joint fi ling and determine which couples would face a marriage penalty or bonus. The main advantages to using TAXSIM is that it requires relatively few input variables, and is simple to execute when investigating how broad changes, such as a change in fi ling status, affects overall tax liability. In general, input variables to TAXSIM are taken as given from each individual's tax return, meaning that we use the reported fi ling status, number of dependents, incomes, and expenses in the estimation. We use the number of qualifying children for the child tax credit as reported in the CDW to calculate the couple's child tax credit. Because TAXSIM does not require EITC-qualifying children as an input variable, the EITC amount it generates is different from the amount calculated based on the number of EITC-qualifying children reported in the CDW. As a result, we replace the TAXSIM-calculated EITC with our own calculation of the EITC using the number of EITC-qualifying children reported in the CDW data.
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Income variables, number of dependents, and number of exemptions are summed within couples to calculate potential joint tax liability. We assume cohabiting couples would maintain the same living arrangements and thus incur the same expenses if they were to marry. Hence, the reported itemized deductions (if claimed) on the separate returns would be the expenses they would incur as married couples. In tax year 2007, the standard deduction was $5,350 for single fi lers, $7,850 for head of household fi lers, and $10,700 for joint fi lers. A couple with one single fi ler and one head of household fi ler would have a greater combined standard deduction when fi ling separately ($13,200 = $5,350 + $7,850) than when fi ling jointly ($10,700). If the couple's total expenses are between $10,700 and $13,200, they might claim the standard deduction on the separate 15 Individuals, with missing ages or ages calculated to be less than 15 or greater than 100, were coded as having the median age of the remaining sample. 16 A couple claims a credit if either or both claim the credit on their separately fi led returns. 17 The CDW reports EITC-qualifying children when a tax unit claims the EITC. Because EITC take-up is not 100 percent, we calculate the potential EITC using the number of exemptions claimed for children living at home when the number of EITC-qualifying children is missing. We also calculate the potential EITC for childless workers who meet the income and earnings requirements. Overall, we impute the credit amount to 3 percent of couples in our sample who did not claim the EITC on their tax return. We calculate the following child-related tax credits: the child and dependent care credit, the child tax credit, the additional child tax credit, and the EITC. We subtract these tax credits from the amount of tax before credits to calculate a taxpayer's fi nal tax liability. A cohabiting couple would face a marriage penalty if their tax liability when fi ling jointly exceeds their combined tax liabilities on the separately fi led returns as unmarried individuals by more than $5. Conversely, a cohabiting couple would face a marriage bonus if their tax liability when fi ling jointly is less than the combined liabilities on the separate returns and the difference is greater than $5. A couple is considered as having no change in tax liability if the difference between the joint and separately-fi led liabilities is $5 or less.
V. RESULTS
If cohabiting couples in our sample had fi led joint returns, 38 percent would have a tax decrease of an average amount of $914; 48 percent would have a tax increase of an average amount of $1,657; and 15 percent would experience no change in federal income tax liability. Table 2 shows that the average tax change for all cohabiting couples is an increase in tax liability of about $450. We explain these results by examining cohabiting couples' fi ling status under separate fi ling, relative income between the two partners, presence of children and several design features of the tax systems, including those for the child-related credits. If they fi le as married couples, 15 percent of couples with children claim the child and dependent care credit. This is 2 percentage points less than the proportion of couples with children who claim this credit on separately fi led returns. The fraction of couples with children claiming the child tax credit increases from 62 to 66 percent if the couples fi le joint returns while the fraction of couples claiming the additional child tax credit decreases from 46 to 34 percent. Taking into account both the non-refundable and refundable portions of the child tax credit, the proportion of couples with children claiming the credit increases from 77 percent under separate fi ling to 80 percent under joint fi ling. The percentage of couples with children claiming the EITC declines from 71 percent to 32 percent when switching from separate fi ling to joint fi ling. Among childless couples, the proportion of couples claiming the EITC falls from 11 to 2 percent. Table 3 shows the potential incidence of marriage penalties and bonuses by couples' fi ling status on the separately fi led returns. For dual single-fi ler couples, 43 percent would have a marriage penalty, 37 percent would have a marriage bonus, and 20 percent would have no tax change. These couples would have a higher likelihood of having no tax change and a lower likelihood of having a marriage penalty than average. When at least one person claims the head of household fi ling status, the likelihood of having a marriage penalty is much higher than average. A marriage penalty would result for 82 percent of couples with one head of household fi ler and 92 percent of couples with two head of household fi lers. Although the standard deduction for joint fi lers is twice the amount for single fi lers, the standard deduction for head of household fi lers is in between the amounts for single and joint fi lers. As a result, the amount of standard deduction declines under joint fi ling if one or both persons fi le as head of household on the separate returns. As indicated in Table 3 , about 50 percent of the couples with at least one head of household fi ler claim a smaller standard deduction when they fi le a joint return. Table 3 also shows that the majority of one-fi ler couples have a marriage bonus: 75 percent of one-fi ler couples have marriage bonuses and only 2 percent have marriage penalties. The marriage bonus rate is relatively high among one-fi ler couples because joint fi ling increases the amount of standard deduction for these couples as the joint amount is greater than that for single or head of household fi lers. About 83 percent of one-fi ler cohabiting couples claim a higher standard deduction if they fi le as married couples. In addition, 23 percent of one-fi ler couples have no tax change when they fi le jointly. We fi nd that almost all of these couples do not owe any income tax when fi ling separately or jointly. Table 4 shows the relationship between the relative income within a couple and potential marriage penalties and bonuses. 20 As the relative income between the two spouses becomes more equal, the couple is less likely to have marriage bonuses and more likely to have marriage penalties. For couples in which one person earns less than 5 percent (including zero) of the family's total income, over three-quarters of the couples have a marriage bonus and only 3 percent have a marriage penalty. For couples in which the lower-income person earns 40 to 50 percent of the family income, 11 percent of the couples have a marriage bonus and 63 percent have a marriage penalty.
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The pattern in marriage bonus and penalty rates by relative AGI is partially explained by the fact that the widths of tax brackets for joint fi lers are less than twice the widths for single fi lers for the higher tax brackets. Consequently, the statutory marginal tax rate faced by a couple with similar incomes could be higher than the statutory marginal tax rates on their separate returns, thereby creating a marriage penalty. However, because the widths of tax brackets for joint fi lers are greater than the widths for non-joint fi l- Categorization is based on potential marriage bonus or penalty incurred if a cohabiting couple fi led a joint return instead of separately fi led returns.
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To preserve confi dentiality of taxpayer data, cells with less than 10 observations are masked. Marginal tax rate refers to the statutory marginal tax rate.
4
A couple has low income if at least one person has taxable income below the fi ling threshold.
ers, the higher-income person of a couple with dissimilar incomes may have a lower marginal tax rate on the joint return, resulting in a marriage bonus. Table 4 shows that the share of couples in which both individuals experience an increase in the statutory marginal tax rate when fi ling jointly is very small but rises from 1 to 5 percent as relative income becomes more equal. In contrast, as the relative incomes become less equal, the higher-income person is more likely to experience a decrease in the marginal tax rate when fi ling jointly. Nearly half of the couples in which the lower-income person earns less than 10 percent of the family income experience such a rate decrease, compared to 7 percent of couples in which the lower-income person earns 40 to 50 percent of the family income. Among couples in which the lower-income person earns less than 5 percent of the family income, 25 percent of the higher-income individuals experience a reduction in the statutory marginal tax rate. This fraction is relatively low compared to the 5 to 10 percent group because most couples in the 0 to 5 percent group are lowincome couples who have no tax liability or remain in the lowest tax bracket regardless of whether they fi le separately or jointly. In addition to a lower statutory marginal tax rate for the higher-income person, couples with unequal incomes also benefi t from an increase in the value of deduction and exemptions claimed on a joint return when combining a very low income (i.e., below the deduction and exemption level on the separate return) with a higher income. Table 4 lists the percentages of couples who benefi t from this change by the share of AGI earned by the family's lower-income person. Couples in which the lower-income individual makes less than 5 percent of the couple's combined income consist mainly of one-fi ler couples, and therefore, the vast majority -over 80 percent -benefi t from an increase in the value of deduction and exemptions claimed on the joint return. The proportion of couples that benefi t from this change decreases to 51 percent when the lower-income individual makes 5 to 10 percent of the couple's combined AGI and to 33 percent when this income share increases to 10 to 20 percent.
Moreover, Table 4 shows that couples with no change in tax liability mainly consist of those with similar incomes or those with very unequal incomes. Further analysis illustrates that the couples with similar incomes are primarily those with two single fi lers whose combined tax liability from two single returns is the same as the tax liability on the joint return. Couples with unequal incomes are mostly low-income, one-fi ler couples who have no tax liability when fi ling joint or separate returns. Table 5 shows the likelihood of having a marriage bonus or penalty by presence of children. Having children increases the probability of having marriage penalties and decreases the probability of having marriage bonuses or no tax change. In particular, 52 percent of couples in which one individual has children, 92 percent of couples in which both individuals have children, and 38 percent of childless couples would have marriage penalties. Of couples in which one person has children, 38 percent have marriage bonuses and 10 percent have no change in tax liability. For couples in which both individuals have children, only 8 percent experience a marriage bonus. In contrast, 42 percent of childless couples have marriage bonuses and 20 percent have no tax change.
The presence of children increases penalty rates for two main reasons. First, among dual fi ler couples, over 50 percent of couples in which one person has children and almost all couples in which both have children have at least one head of household fi ler. As discussed earlier, couples with at least one head of household fi ler are much more likely to have a marriage penalty than average. Second, conditional on claiming the EITC on their separate returns, about 58 percent of the couples in which one adult has children and 98 percent of the couples in which both adults have children experience a reduction in EITC. As indicated in Table 5 , most of these couples lose the credit completely when they fi le a joint return. Even though a high proportion of childless couples that claim the EITC on their separate returns also experience a reduction in EITC when fi ling jointly, a smaller proportion (11 percent) initially claim the EITC.
21 Table 6 shows the changes in the values of various child-related tax credits and fi nal tax liability by marriage bonus and penalty status among couples with children. The average decrease in the EITC for couples with a marriage penalty is $1,761, representing about 81 percent of the group's average increase in tax liability ($2,175) under joint fi ling. In contrast, some couples receive a larger EITC when combining two earnings on a joint 21 The EITC for childless workers is phased out at a much lower level of earned income than the credit for workers with children, which contributes to explaining the small proportion of childless workers who claim the credit.
Table 6
Changes in Taxes Notes: Changes are calculated by subtracting the sum of amounts when fi ling separately from the joint amount.
Table 7
return because they move up farther along the credit's phase-in region. Couples with marriage bonuses have a small average increase in the EITC of $9 if they fi le jointly, minimally contributing to the group's lower tax liability. Changes in the child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC) are not correlated with the marriage penalty and bonus outcomes. As shown in Table 6 , both couples with marriage penalties and couples with marriage bonuses receive a smaller CDCTC on their joint returns. While the decrease in the credit amount is larger for couples with penalties than those with bonuses ($43 and $12, respectively), the magnitudes are relatively insignifi cant compared to the change in fi nal tax liability. Because the credit rate for the CDCTC is phased down by the same income schedule regardless of fi ling status, combining two individuals' incomes on the joint return results in a lower credit rate among couples who claim the credit on their separate returns. Table 6 indicates that the total child tax credit, which includes the non-refundable and refundable portions, increases for couples with marriage bonuses as well as for those with marriage penalties. For couples with marriage bonuses, the total child tax credit increases by $173, representing about 20 percent of the group's average change in tax liability ($828) if they were to switch to joint fi ling. For couples with marriage penalties, the total child tax credit increases by $219, moderately offsetting the group's increase in tax liability ($2,175) under joint fi ling. Further investigation shows that some low-income individuals have limited tax liability against which to claim the non-refundable portion of the credit on their separately fi led returns. In addition, the refundable portion of the child credit requires a minimum earned income ($11,750 in 2007) 22 and is phased-in based on earnings, consequently preventing some low-income individuals from claiming the maximum credit. These restrictions are relaxed on the joint return when the partners combine incomes. In addition, because the phase-out of the credit starts at a higher income level for joint than non-joint fi lers, some higherincome individuals whose income is in (or above) the phase-out range under the single or head of household credit schedules can receive a larger amount (or newly receive the credit) when they fi le as married fi ling jointly. Table 7 lists the tax changes for childless couples by marriage bonus and penalty status. Average tax liability decreases by $967 for couples with a marriage bonus and increases by $997 for those with a marriage penalty. These changes are in line with the group's respective decrease or increase in the tax before credits. While the EITC declines for childless couples when they fi le a joint return, the magnitude of this change is modest, refl ecting the relatively low maximum amount of the childless EITC.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we show that the vast majority of cohabiting couples would experience a change in tax liability if they were to fi le as married couples. We determine that 48 percent of our sample would have a marriage penalty and 38 percent would have a marriage bonus if they had fi led a joint return. 23 Examining statistics by family characteristics shows that penalty rates are higher among couples with children because these couples experience reductions in the amount of standard deduction as well as reductions in the EITC when switching from separate to joint fi ling. The incidence of penalties and bonuses among childless couples is mainly a result of differences in the rate schedules and, for one-fi ler couples, differences in the standard deduction between the joint and non-joint fi ling statuses. Under these features of the tax system, whether a childless couple has a marriage penalty or bonus depends on the relative incomes of the two partners.
The results from this paper illustrate the disparate tax burdens of cohabiting couples and married couples, but our sample may not necessarily represent the population of cohabiting couples. Among newly married couples in 2008 in which only one person fi led a tax return in 2007, we are only able to identify 13 percent as cohabiting by locating the non-fi ler as a dependent on the fi ler's return. In addition, we examine cohabiting couples in the year prior to their joint fi ling and consequently, our results may be biased by only looking at cohabiting relationships that result in marriage. Even with these limitations, the results in this paper still provide policymakers with information on how future changes in tax policy could affect potential marriage taxes among cohabiting couples.
The disparate tax burdens of cohabiting couples and married couples raise issues with respect to horizontal equity and proper adjustments to tax liability to refl ect a family's ability to pay. It also raises the question of how to adapt the current tax system to accommodate changes in family structure. While we do not propose any options to resolve these issues, we highlight the contributing factors and tax consequences that should be taken into account when evaluating a reform proposal. In the future, we plan on extending this analysis to include more years of data and by conducting policy simulations to determine how changes to the tax code affect potential marriage taxes of cohabiting couples.
